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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
W. K. Bachelder*
Some Precautions in Taking Photographs for Future Use in Court-
Two recent cases highlight some dangers which the police should
consider in taking photographs which may later be used in court. In
East Wisconsin. Trustee Co. v. O'Neil, 39 N.W. (2d) 369 (Wise. 1949),
police photographs were used to show that defendant's automobile was
in the wrong lane when it hit plaintiff's car. The skid marks were
outlined in chalk, and one policeman was pictured indicating where
the impact occurred. The court held that the part showing place of
impact was improper, for that was the very thing the jury was sup-
posed to decide. Fortunately, however, the court did not exclude the
photo, but only directed the jury to disregard the improper part. If
the photo had been excluded, the police might not have had an accept-
able substitute. In some jurisdictions even the chalk marks might
have been challenged as giving a false picture of the scene rather than
one as it really looked.
To avoid ruining good evidence, it might be safer to photograph the
scene exactly as it looked before adding anything which is felt to be
necessary to bring out the desired points in the picture, so that if the
better photograph is excluded there wil be something available for use.
The danger of relying on photographs which do not include every-
thing is shown in Ross v. Stricser, 88 N.E. (2d) 80 (Ohio App. 1949),
another automobile accident case, where a traffic expert was asked to
testify about the probable routes of the vehicles as deduced by him
from a picture of their position after the crash. His testimony was
excluded because the police photograph had failed to show that a third
automobile .had struck the others after their crash, thus changing their
position, and so the expert's conclusions were inadmissible because
they were not at all related to the facts before that court. It is possible
that the nature of this accident was such that a true picture of the
cars would not have been capable of being used by the expert, but
at least it would have revealed this fact to him, thus saving expense
and embarrassment to all concerned. If it could have been used for
anything, this failure to show everything having a bearing on the
position of the cars destroyed its value completely.
(Extensive discussions of use of photographic evidence will be found
in Scott, Photographic Evidence (1942), and 3 Wigmore, Evidence
(1940) §§790, 798. With regard to automobile cases particularly, see
the Accident Investigation Manual of Northwestern University Traffic
Institute (1946).)
Danger of Ruining Good Case with Unnecessary Confession-Some
recent cases have emphasized the danger when police, eager to gather
as much evidence as possible against an accused, extort a confession
from him, with the result that the whole case is endangered because
this confession should not have been presented to the jury, whereas
without it they would have had a convincing case anyhow. In
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), and in State v. Dietz, 68 A. (2d)
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777 (N.J. App. 1949), the prosecution's very strong case against the
defendant was reversed, with a new trial required, because in each the
state had unnecessarily presented an involuntary confession in evi-
dence. At one time it might have been held that the conviction would
not be reversed if there was sufficient valid evidence before the jury
to leave no reasonable doubt of guilt, but today-some courts will order
a new trial because it is felt that such confessions are too prejudicial
to expect the jury to have weighed the other evidence fairly. Moreover,
there is a growing desire to prevent the extraction of such confessions,
and some courts feel that the best way to do this is to upset every case
where a coerced confession is used. This means that the police must
always be conscious that a confession obtained by force may be more
than useless to them; it may result in an otherwise guilty man escaping
conviction or at the least delaying a final judicial determination of his
guilt.
Expanding Use of Chemical Tests for Intoxication-Although at least
seven states have statutes providing for use of chemical tests of intoxi-
cation (Indiana, Maine, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, South
Dakota, and Washington--see Vol 40, p. 253 of this Journal), there
is increasing use of these same tests in states where the legislature
has not acted. One city, Peoria, Illinois, has adopted the use of the
drunkometer by city ordinance. (Peoria City Ordinance 'No. 5589.)
This Peoria ordinance contains the unique provision, however that the
person on whom the test is used must sign an affidavit that he is sub-
mitting to it voluntarily.
There is a growing tendency of courts to accept the results of
alcoholic tests in evidence, even in the absence of legislative authoriza-
tion. Recently, trial courts in Columbus, Ohio, and Chicago, Illinois,
have permitted such evidence in convicting defendants of drunken
driving. The Ohio court admitted the results of a urinalysis as collab-
orative evidence to support other testimony. The Chicago court heard
Drs. Harger and Muehlberger testify from the results of the drunk-
ometer. In New Hampshire, the highest court of the state ruled that
an analysis of blood taken without the defendant's consent was admis-
sible in evidence. State v. Sturtivant, 18 L.W. 2324 (N.H. 1950). The
New Hampshire court said this was not within the privilege of self-
incrimination because the privilege protects only against testimonial
compulsion, citing Wigmore, Evidence (1940) §§2263-2266, and that it
did not accept the federal rule as to exclusion of evidence obtained by
illegal searches or seizures, so defendant's argument on that score was
also refused. (See Vol. 35, p. 202 of this Journal. The value of these
tests is attacked and defended in Vol. 39, pp. 225, 402, and 411.)
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